Why Couldn't the Dolphins Generate Explosive Plays Last Season?

The Miami Dolphins offense had built a reputation for being one of the most explosive units in the NFL during Coach Mike McDaniel’s first two seasons. 

Between 2022 and 2023, the Dolphins had the fourth-most plays that generated 25 or more yards from the line of scrimmage (87). Miami was only behind San Francisco (100), Kansas City (96) and Detroit (88). 

However, the Dolphins’ explosive-play ability declined sharply in the 2024 season. Miami’s 19 plays that generated 25 or more yards were last in the league, finishing five behind the Cleveland Browns, who were 31st. 

In fact, 19 is the fewest number of plays of 25 or more yards the Dolphins have generated since the 2007 season (14) — when they finished 1-15. Miami’s 2024 offense wasn’t anywhere near as bad as the unit that went 1-15 in 2007, but it’s jarring to see any stat come close to that group. 

So, where did all the explosive plays go last season? Well, like most things in football, there are a myriad of reasons why tendencies develop. We’ve decided to narrow it down to a few, and then discuss how Miami can address these issues this season. 

Injury Setbacks

This is the easiest one to get out of the way, but it’s undoubtedly part of the equation. Tua Tagovailoa’s injuries held the passing game back a good bit last year. 

Tua played in just 11 games last season, the fewest since his rookie season when he started the year as Ryan Fitzpatrick’s backup. Of the Dolphins’ 15 pass completions that went for 25 or more yards in 2024, Tua was responsible for 13 of them. 

The only two the Dolphins had when he was injured came when Dee Eskridge turned a short pass from Tim Boyle into 30 yards in Week 3 against the Seahawks, and when Tyler Huntley hit a deep ball to Tyreek Hill in Week 17 against the Browns. 

Tua’s injury wasn’t the only high-impact one on offense. Right tackle Austin Jackson’s season-ending injury in Week 9 against Buffalo coincided with a marked drop in the team’s running game production. 

Jackson wasn’t the sole reason for that drop, but it doesn’t take a genius to look at the Dolphins’ rushing yards per game average with Jackson (133.9) and that number without Jackson (80.4) to see his impact. 

The Dolphins did generate more explosive runs without Jackson (3 vs. 1), but that sample size is so low that it doesn’t make sense to draw conclusions from it. 

Miami’s running game was much better with Jackson, and the team likely would have generated the same or more explosives with him in the lineup down the stretch. 

How Defenses Played Miami 

Injuries played a decent role in why the Dolphins didn’t generate a ton of big plays last season, but it’s not like the team was ripping them off when completely healthy. 

Perhaps the biggest reason Miami struggled in this area is that it didn’t have many favorable looks to generate big plays in the passing game. The Dolphins had the most dropbacks in the league in which opposing defenses played with two high safeties (202). 

The next-closest team was the Browns, who had 159 dropbacks against two-high defenses. If you include Cover-4 — another defense designed to stop big plays — Miami is still in first, beating out the Browns by a slightly slimmer margin of 20 dropbacks. 

This isn’t a new trend for the Dolphins to deal with. They had the most dropbacks against two-high defenses (Cover-2, 2-man) in 2023, but that was only on 135 dropbacks. In 2022, the Dolphins were tied for sixth with 125 dropbacks against two-high. 

Defenses will always look to put a roof on the Dolphins’ offense as long as Jaylen Waddle and Tyreek Hill are on the roster. However, there’s a difference between defenses playing a lot of two high and the Dolphins seeing it drastically more than any other team. 

So, why were defenses capable of sitting back in two-high shells all season? Well, because there was no running game to respect. 

Offenses' usual solution for when defenses want to sit back and prevent big plays is just to run the ball down their throat. This will force the defense to drop an extra player into the box to contest with the run, leaving more space on the backend. 

During the second half of the season, Miami’s running game became a shell of the unit it was in 2023, whether you look at per-attempt stats or stick with big plays. The Dolphins had 13 rushes of more than 25 yards in 2023, compared to four in 2024. 

Having a running play go for that many yards is much harder than a pass, so that 2023 number probably wasn’t sustainable. But even if you drop the yardage threshold from 25 to 20, Miami only had eight such runs in 2024, down from 17 in 2023. 

Once defenses realize they can win one-on-one battles in the trenches and expose the Dolphins’ perimeter blocking on outside zone concepts, what’s the point of worrying about the running game? 

They can just sit back, keep Waddle and Hill in front of them, and force the Dolphins to move down the field methodically. When you’re relying on some combination of a backup quarterback, backup right tackle, and two guards who are not NFL-caliber starters for a decent chunk of the season, that’s a recipe for disaster. 

To the Dolphins’ credit, they did prove they’re capable of putting up points that way. 

From Weeks 8 through 16 — when Tua returned from his concussion and before he suffered his hip injury — the Dolphins were seventh in offensive success rate, third in EPA per dropback, and ninth in offensive points per game. 

While Miami must find a way to generate more explosive plays in 2025, it’s not like the offense is completely helpless without them. 

How Can The Dolphins Fix It? 

There are two key factors in getting the offense back to generating big plays: personnel and diversified play-calling. 

From the personnel side of things, the Dolphins had to invest in improving the offensive line and perimeter blocking this offseason. They tried to scheme around having small receivers make critical blocks and below-average guard play for too long. 

Whether it works out remains to be seen, but the Dolphins invested in guard by signing James Daniels and trading up to draft Jonah Savaiinaea. Plus, free agent additions Nick Westbrook-Ikhine and Pharoah Brown are much better perimeter blockers than players like Braxton Berrios and Durham Smythe. 

Those four additions could go a long way toward making the running game more consistent and more explosive, which in turn could get defenses out of their two-high shells. 

The other part of the equation is diversifying the offense, both in play calling and personnel. The Dolphins’ offense got way too predictable last season. From an overreliance on outside zone concepts to the same quick-hitting routes, the Dolphins were a one-trick pony in 2024. 

The only changeup the Dolphins threw at teams last season was peppering tight end Jonnu Smith with targets in the short middle of the field. That’s just not enough of a diverse threat to force defenses into different looks. 

In the running game, the Dolphins need to find a way to generate more yards between the tackles. Whether that’s from running more gap/man, inside zone, or Duo concepts doesn’t matter, but it needs to come from somewhere. 

The previously mentioned personnel additions should allow the Dolphins to experiment with that, as Daniels and Savaiinaea are far better equipped to execute those concepts. 

In the passing game, Miami needs to find a way to incorporate more types of players than just small, speed receivers. Additionally, the team finding a way to attack defenses outside the numbers could go a long way to opening the middle of the field. 

The Dolphins’ lack of big plays wasn’t the team’s defining issue last season, but instead, a symptom of an offense that was not dictating terms. 

Miami can still get the ball out faster than any other team and major in outside-zone rushing concepts. It doesn’t need to change its core identity, but it does need to expand what it’s capable of to generate explosive plays like it did in 2023 and 2022.

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