Atlanta Braves 2026 Season Report Card

Heading into spring training, there was plenty of discussion surrounding Atlanta’s starting rotation. After dealing with what felt like an endless string of injuries over the previous two seasons, the Braves finally appeared set to enter the year with a relatively healthy group of starters. However, that optimism didn’t last very long.

Both Spencer Schwellenbach and Hurston Waldrep underwent minor elbow surgeries, adding to a growing list of concerns. AJ Smith-Shawver was still recovering from Tommy John surgery, while questions continued to surround Spencer Strider’s health. Suddenly, the rotation that looked like it could be one of Atlanta’s biggest strengths was once again facing serious uncertainty.

Only four pitchers made at least 15 starts for the Braves in 2026: Grant Holmes (29), Chris Sale (27), Martín Pérez (26), and Bryce Elder (26). Five other pitchers made at least five starts, while another seven took the mound as a starter at least once. For those counting at home, that’s 16 different pitchers who started a game for Atlanta this season. Hardly the rotation anyone envisioned back in February.

And yet, for much of the season, this was the group that carried the Braves to victory.

Atlanta’s starters finished with the sixth best ERA in baseball at 3.76, trailing only the Yankees, Dodgers, Rays, Tigers, and Brewers. They also ranked eighth in quality starts with 61.

Chris Sale put together a season worthy of Cy Young consideration, if only Jacob Misiorowski didn’t exist. Martín Pérez (3.12 ERA) and Grant Holmes (3.57 ERA) both finished among the top 40 starters in ERA with a minimum of 100 innings pitched. Meanwhile, Bryce Elder recorded 15 quality starts across his 26 outings.

Then there was Tyler Mahle. While much of the conversation surrounding the trade deadline focused on which big-name starter Atlanta should acquire, Alex Anthopoulos quietly landed Mahle from the San Francisco Giants. His overall season numbers might not jump off the page, but what he accomplished after arriving in Atlanta made him arguably the best acquisition of the entire trade deadline.

And for those who believed the rotation’s regular season success wouldn’t translate to October, the Braves’ starters had something to say about that. Heading into the World Series, Atlanta’s starting pitchers ranked first in postseason WHIP (0.89), first in SIERA (2.69), second in ERA (2.14), second in FIP (2.36), and third in K/BB rate (7.20).

Yes, it’s a small sample, but it reinforces what we saw throughout the regular season. Were there issues? Absolutely.

The rotation occasionally struggled to pitch deep into games throughout the year, and some of the underlying metrics suggested the results weren’t always sustainable. But ultimately, a pitcher’s job is to keep runs off the scoreboard. It wasn’t always pretty, but over the course of the season, that’s exactly what this group did.

I also understand the concern about expecting similar production in 2027 with some of the question marks the rotation has heading into next season. Still, considering everything this rotation endured, it’s difficult to look at the final results and come away disappointed.

In another season defined by injuries to the starting staff, Atlanta’s rotation did much more than simply hold its own. It excelled.

Bullpen (A-)

If you were handing out an MVP award to an entire position group, Atlanta’s bullpen would be the runaway winner. Of course, when an organization allocates roughly $75 million to its bullpen, expectations should be pretty high.

The majority of that money was tied up in five pitchers, and for Raisel Iglesias and Robert Suarez, the investment was money well spent. Iglesias finished the season with a 2.55 ERA and 34 saves, while Suarez posted a remarkable 1.06 ERA with 16 combined holds and saves despite missing a couple of months due to injury.

The story surrounding the other three expensive relievers, however, was considerably different.

Reynaldo López bounced between the rotation and bullpen when healthy but struggled for much of the season. Tyler Kinley was designated for assignment in August after a difficult year, while Joe Jiménez spent nearly the entire season injured yet again. At the very least, it was encouraging to finally see Jiménez return to a major league mound.

Interestingly enough, it was the much less expensive arms that really made this bullpen special.

Didier Fuentes wasn’t just arguably Atlanta’s best reliever. At only 21 years old, the rookie established himself as one of the better relief pitchers in all of baseball. Across 57 appearances, Fuentes posted a 2.05 ERA, 2.55 FIP, 30.5% strikeout rate, 85.3% left on base rate, and 2.0 fWAR. He quickly became Walt Weiss’ go-to option in just about every difficult situation imaginable.

Dylan Lee (2.1 fWAR) once again established himself as one of the better left-handed relievers in baseball, although he appeared to run out of steam down the stretch. Dylan Dodd (2.54 ERA) enjoyed a breakout season in a full-time relief role, seemingly improving with each passing month.

The additions of Victor Mederos (3.41 ERA) and Brent Suter (1.82 ERA) also proved to be excellent value acquisitions, with both outperforming what Atlanta gave up to acquire them.

And, of course, who could forget Ray Kerr’s return and the way he took the baseball world by storm during the postseason?

When you put everything together, the numbers speak for themselves. Atlanta’s bullpen finished with the highest left on-base rate (77.4%) and Win Probability Added (11.68) in baseball. The group also ranked second in WHIP (1.19), fourth in ERA (3.44), and seventh in SIERA (3.70).

Looking ahead, there’s plenty of reason to believe this success can continue. Suarez, Fuentes, Lee, Dodd, Kerr, and Mederos are all under contract for 2027, giving Atlanta an excellent foundation to build around.

The Braves will likely need to add a couple of arms, especially if Fuentes transitions back into a starting role. However, there are also several options within the minor league system who could eventually contribute as well.

For much of my lifetime, the Atlanta Braves have consistently featured one of the better bullpens in baseball. That was certainly the case in 2026, and I wouldn’t be surprised if we’re having this same conversation a year from now.

Offense (D+)

This grade might seem a little harsh, but it reflects just how highly I view the potential of Atlanta’s offense.

Before diving into the numbers, it’s worth mentioning that Jurickson Profar was suspended yet again for performance-enhancing drugs just weeks before the season began, this time for all 162 games. The Braves had already signed Mike Yastrzemski to share left field duties with Profar, but had they known the latter would be unavailable for the entire season, there’s a good chance their offseason approach may have looked different.

That certainly didn’t help matters, but it was far from the biggest reason the offense struggled.

Through the end of April, Atlanta looked like one of the most dangerous offensive teams in baseball. The Braves carried a .786 OPS and 116 wRC+, both ranking among the top four in the league.

Then May arrived, and everything changed. From May 1 through the end of the regular season, Atlanta’s offensive production plummeted to a .701 OPS and 93 wRC+. For the season, the Braves finished with a .718 OPS, good for 17th in baseball, while their 97 wRC+ ranked just 20th.

That’s simply not the production you expect from a lineup card featuring Ronald Acuña Jr., Matt Olson, Drake Baldwin, Austin Riley, Ozzie Albies, and Michael Harris II. While some of those players performed well individually, it wasn’t enough to make up for the struggles elsewhere in the lineup.

Both Yastrzemski (.688 OPS) and Riley (.654 OPS) posted the worst offensive seasons of their respective careers. Before his postseason surge, Albies had managed just a .685 OPS and 86 wRC+ during the regular season.

Lane Thomas, arguably the best offensive player Atlanta acquired at the trade deadline, made just 46 plate appearances before suffering an injury. Then there were Ha-Seong Kim and Sean Murphy, both of whom struggled so badly at the plate that they were borderline unplayable offensively.

However, my biggest issue with Atlanta’s offense wasn’t necessarily the individual performances. It was the overall approach. Too often, Braves hitters would watch hittable strikes go by, chase pitches outside the zone, or completely miss a mistake pitch that should have been driven into the gap or over the fence.

Strikeouts weren’t necessarily the biggest problem. Atlanta didn’t strike out at an unusually high rate, but its 7.7% walk rate was the third lowest in baseball. The Braves also posted a 36.3% chase rate, the second worst mark in the league, while ranking near the bottom in fastball runs above average according to multiple models, including Pitch Info and Statcast.

When Atlanta made contact, the ball was often hit hard. The problem was that the Braves simply couldn’t string together enough quality at-bats, particularly with runners on base.

How many times did we watch a hitter come to the plate with a chance to break a game open, only to swing at the first pitch and record an out, fail to bring a runner home, or roll into an inning-ending double play? It happened far too often.

Now, I understand that the Braves aren’t built like the Milwaukee Brewers or Tampa Bay Rays. Atlanta’s projected lineup features considerably more power, which naturally comes with more swing and miss. There’s nothing inherently wrong with that approach. In fact, we’ve seen just how successful it can be when executed properly.

The issue is that an offense built around slugging has to capitalize on pitches it can drive. I can live with a little more chase and whiff than I’d personally prefer if the tradeoff is a lineup consistently punishing fastballs and mistakes in the strike zone. We’ve seen Atlanta do exactly that in previous seasons. In 2026, we didn’t see nearly enough of it.

The good news is that much of this offensive core is already under contract for 2027 and beyond. Some might view that as a problem, but I still have plenty of faith in this group.

That doesn’t mean Atlanta should simply run everything back and hope for better results. I’d like to see the Braves add at least one more legitimate impact bat this offseason, both as insurance against continued struggles and as a way to lengthen the lineup.

The talent and track records of several players give me reason to believe this offense can bounce back next season. But if it doesn’t, the concerns surrounding Atlanta’s offensive future are only going to grow louder.

Defense (B+)

One area where Atlanta continued to perform at a high level was defensively. The Braves finished fourth in baseball with 23 Outs Above Average (OAA), fourth with 62 Defensive Runs Saved (DRS), fifth with just 65 errors committed, and seventh with a 19 Fielding Run Value (FRV).

Leading the way were two familiar names: Matt Olson and Michael Harris II.

Olson put together another season worthy of Gold Glove consideration, finishing among the top 20 defenders in baseball in DRS, OAA, and FRV. Among first basemen, he led the league in OAA and FRV while trailing only Ty France in DRS. At this point, Olson playing elite defense at first base has almost become something we take for granted.

Harris was equally impressive in center field. If Pete Crow-Armstrong didn’t exist, Harris would have a legitimate argument for the National League Gold Glove at the position. Among qualified center fielders, Harris ranked third in OAA (13), fourth in DRS (9), and fourth in FRV (12).

Both Austin Riley and Ozzie Albies also finished with positive defensive seasons, giving Atlanta solid production throughout much of the infield.

Behind the plate, however, things were a little more complicated.

Both Drake Baldwin (-5) and Sean Murphy (-2) graded well below average in Baseball Savant’s Catcher Caught Stealing Above Average metric. Neither stood out particularly well in pop time either, with both finishing around the middle of the league.

There were some positives, though. Baldwin ranked in the 68th percentile in blocking, while Murphy finished in the 73rd percentile, according to Baseball Savant. Baldwin also reached the 61st percentile in pitch framing, an encouraging development for Braves fans who have been hoping to see improvement in that area of his game.

Overall, Atlanta’s defense was once again a clear strength. There were certainly a handful of costly mistakes, some coming at the worst possible times, that ultimately hurt the Braves. But over the course of 162 games, the defensive unit was consistently among the better groups in baseball and deserves plenty of credit for its performance.

Coaching (A)

I’ll be the first to admit that I, along with plenty of others in Braves Country, owe Walt Weiss a bit of an apology. When Atlanta began its managerial search, I was among those who believed the organization would benefit from bringing in someone outside the Bobby Cox coaching tree.

So when Weiss was ultimately announced as the new manager, the decision felt somewhat underwhelming. Many questioned whether he was the right person to lead the Braves into their next chapter. Looking back, those concerns were largely unfounded.

One of the first signs that Atlanta had made the right decision was the coaching staff assembled around Weiss. And honestly, there’s an argument that Jeremy Hefner was one of the most valuable additions to the entire organization.

After coming over from the New York Mets, Hefner quickly demonstrated why he had earned such a strong reputation around the league. The way he managed the pitching staff, helped get the most out of Bryce Elder, Grant Holmes, and Dylan Dodd, and played a role in Tyler Mahle’s turnaround deserves a tremendous amount of credit.

Atlanta’s pitching staff consistently outperformed expectations, even as injuries forced the Braves to rely on arms that weren’t necessarily expected to play such significant roles.

Antoan Richardson was another intriguing addition from the Mets. When he was hired, I was particularly excited about the potential impact he could have on Atlanta’s baserunning. That improvement didn’t fully materialize in year one, but there were encouraging signs that could point toward better results in 2027.

It’s also worth remembering that Richardson’s approach on the bases really began to stand out during his second season with the Mets.

Tommy Watkins also proved to be a positive addition. He might not have had the same aggressive windmill arm that Braves fans became accustomed to seeing from Ron Washington, but he rarely seemed to make the wrong decision when sending runners.

Ultimately, though, the biggest reason this coaching staff earns an A comes down to Weiss himself. No manager is perfect, and there were certainly decisions worth questioning throughout the season. But the number of games Weiss positively influenced with his decision-making was impressive.

Whether it was knowing which reliever to trust in a particular situation, identifying the right moment to pinch run, or making timely substitutions despite a roster constantly dealing with injuries, Weiss seemed to have a strong feel for the game. Just as importantly, the players clearly responded to him.

Considering the challenges Atlanta faced throughout the year, it’s difficult to ask much more from a first-year manager. I’m excited to see what Weiss can accomplish in his second season, especially with a full year of experience leading this particular group.

Front Office (B-)

I have a feeling this grade might generate the most disagreement, and I completely understand why. There were certainly opportunities for Atlanta to improve its roster during the offseason and at the trade deadline. Several of the moves the Braves did make also failed to produce the results everyone hoped for.

But there were some significant successes that I don’t believe have received nearly enough attention. However, let’s start with the negatives.

Ha-Seong Kim was easily one of the biggest disappointments from Atlanta’s offseason. You can’t predict injuries, especially one as unusual as Kim slipping on ice while back home in Korea before spring training.

Unfortunately, that injury set the tone for what became another difficult season at shortstop. It was yet another year the Braves struggled to find consistent offensive production from the shortstop position.

Mike Yastrzemski was another acquisition that didn’t pan out as expected. He endured the worst offensive season of his career, particularly against right-handed pitching.

Originally signed to platoon with Jurickson Profar in left field, Yastrzemski was forced into a larger role once Profar’s suspension was announced. That certainly wasn’t the situation Atlanta envisioned when making the signing, but the results were disappointing nonetheless.

Before the season, there were also plenty of calls for the Braves to add another starting pitcher, a legitimate impact bat, or both. I was pretty steadfast in my belief that Atlanta had enough pitching, but I certainly wanted to see more offensive help. Alex Anthopoulos ultimately chose not to make a major addition in either area.

And while I believe his decision to trust the pitching staff was ultimately justified, the lack of additional offensive firepower proved costly. Atlanta simply didn’t have enough reliable bats to withstand the injuries and prolonged slumps that developed throughout the season. That failure to build more offensive depth played a significant role in preventing the Braves from reaching their ultimate goal.

Now, let’s talk about what went right.

Anthopoulos may have pulled off two of the best value trades in baseball this season.

During the offseason, Atlanta sent Nick Allen to the Houston Astros in exchange for Mauricio Dubón, a move that appeared to be motivated largely by Houston looking to shed salary.

Dubón responded by putting together the best offensive season of his career while providing the Braves with valuable versatility at both shortstop and in the outfield. That’s the type of move that doesn’t necessarily generate major headlines when it happens but can make a significant difference over the course of a season.

Robert Suarez also proved to be a worthwhile investment. Although he missed a couple of months due to injury, Suarez finished the season with a 1.06 ERA, 0.88 WHIP, and 4.33 K/BB rate across 33 appearances. He’s now expected to take over as Atlanta’s closer in 2027, returning to the same role that saw him lead the league in saves with the San Diego Padres in 2025.

Then came the trade deadline. While other contenders focused on acquiring some of the bigger names available, Atlanta made a relatively quiet move to land Tyler Mahle.

As I mentioned earlier, the results were outstanding. After joining the Braves, Mahle outpitched every other starting pitcher moved at the deadline. Among that group, he recorded the second most quality starts, allowed the fourth fewest earned runs, and ranked among the top 10 in K/BB rate and WHIP.

For a move that received relatively little attention at the time, it ended up being one of the most impactful acquisitions of the entire deadline.

But there’s one final aspect of Atlanta’s front office performance that deserves recognition, and it might be the most overlooked. Sometimes, the best moves are the ones you don’t make.

Throughout both the offseason and trade deadline, there was constant pressure for Anthopoulos to add more starting pitching. Rather than spending significant money or prospect capital on arms that might not have provided much of an upgrade, Atlanta largely trusted what it already had. As the B- grade for the starting rotation suggests, that decision worked out pretty well.

Would Dylan Cease or Michael King have helped? Absolutely. However, neither was a particularly realistic option, especially considering that signing King would have also cost Atlanta the 26th overall pick. Nick Martinez enjoyed a resurgent season with Tampa Bay, but that’s hardly something most people could have predicted entering the year.

Outside of those names, however, Atlanta was arguably better off sticking with its existing options rather than paying a premium for a marginal improvement.

Martín Pérez outperformed both Ranger Suárez and Framber Valdez, two pitchers who generated plenty of interest during the offseason. Grant Holmes and Bryce Elder also outperformed several popular, less expensive alternatives, including Lucas Giolito, Merrill Kelly, and Zac Gallen.

The same argument applies to the trade deadline. Rather than parting with some of the organization’s better prospects to acquire names such as Casey Mize, Robbie Ray, Clay Holmes, Dustin May, José Soriano, or Kevin Gausman, Atlanta chose to stand pat outside of the Mahle acquisition.

Looking at the results, it’s difficult to argue that the Braves made the wrong decision. Both Holmes and Gausman posted ERAs in the 4.00s after the deadline, while the remaining pitchers performed even worse. And considering that everyone outside of Soriano would have been a rental for roughly three months, the decision not to sacrifice valuable prospect capital looks even better in hindsight.

That’s not to suggest Atlanta should avoid making significant moves or that holding on to prospects is always the correct approach. There is absolutely a time and place to be aggressive, especially for an organization with World Series aspirations. But there also has to be a realistic understanding of how much a particular acquisition improves the roster relative to what it costs.

In several instances this season, Anthopoulos correctly identified that the potential upgrade simply wasn’t worth the price. That deserves recognition. Now, the challenge becomes knowing when to take the opposite approach.

There are meaningful improvements this roster needs heading into 2027, particularly on the offensive side of the ball. And while I believe Atlanta made several smart decisions by showing restraint this past season, that doesn’t mean the organization can afford to stand still this winter. I fully expect Anthopoulos and the Braves to explore the moves necessary to put this team back in position to compete for another World Series championship.