Dodgers 2026 NLCS Exit A True ‘Organizational Failure’

The previous two times the Los Angeles Dodgers were eliminated from the postseason, which happened in 2022 and 2023, president of baseball operations Andrew Friedman described the results as an “organizational failure.”

But neither represented the same level of organizational failure as the 2026 National League Championship Series, in which the Milwaukee Brewers swept the Dodgers.

The Brewers outmatched the Dodgers in every area during the series. The Dodgers looked like they did not belong.

“We got outplayed in all facets,” Dodgers manager Dave Roberts said. “Those guys played flawless. Defensively they pitched better than we did, they hit better than we did, they slugged more than we did. You’ve got to sometimes just tip your cap.”

But being outmatched does not just extend to the on-field performance.

Brewers’ skipper Pat Murphy out-managed Roberts, their club was better prepared for every scenario that came up, and their front office appears to have constructed a team with no flaws.

The Dodgers did not belong.

Dave Roberts struggled with roster management

Every time something goes wrong with a team, people are quick to point at the manager and coaching staff. Oftentimes, it’s not fully warranted. This time, Roberts absolutely deserves a portion of the blame for their failures.

His most egregious decision was failing to use Josue De Paula, their most dynamic bat, who was not used in either of their final two games as the offense continued to struggle in the biggest spots.

In Game 3, Roberts burned De Paula to get Enrique Hernández to the plate. After Abner Uribe allowed a two-run double to Will Smith, Miguel Rojas was set to bat.

It was clear Uribe’s night was done, and Murphy said as much after the game. He was going to make a pitching change regardless of what the Dodgers did.

But before Murphy could go to the mound, Roberts sent up De Paula to hit for Rojas. Murphy then went to his bullpen, bringing in the lefty reliever who was warming up, and Roberts countered by sending Hernández to the plate to hit for Rojas.

“We hit De Paula, and they bring in Hall. And I thought right there Enrique was a better matchup,” Roberts said.

“De Paula has been great. He’s had two postseason at-bats, both against right-handed pitching. For me, all the experience that Enrique’s had, I feel very confident with Enrique taking a bat with a guy on second and third, infield in.”

In that instance, Roberts burned their player who had taken the team’s best at-bats consistently, all as a decoy to send up the struggling Hernández. The result was what everyone expected, except for Roberts.

The next night, De Paula did not get a plate appearance, and the Dodgers failed on multiple opportunities to cash in on their runners in scoring position.

But his early decisions may have been just as mind-boggling. Both Hernández and Miguel Rojas were in the starting lineup with the Brewers going with a bullpen game. Roberts opted to sit Max Muncy with the left-handed reliever on the mound, hoping to save him for a spot later in the game where he can hit against a right-hander.

That moment came before Miguel Rojas even had an at-bat. The Brewers did not let Shane Drohan pitch deep into the game, because he’s a reliever, but Roberts set his lineup as if he would pitch into the fifth.

Muncy hit for Rojas the first time his spot came up in the order. Rojas did not get an at-bat, and he was no longer available later in the game.

But if Roberts wanted Rojas to hit against a lefty instead of Muncy, which would make sense, the perfect opportunity came up in the seventh inning with a runner on third base.

The only issue? Roberts burned him earlier in the game for no reason instead of just starting Muncy and getting to pick his opportunity with Rojas.

Late in Game 4, the Dodgers also had Hernández issue a sacrifice bunt with a left-hander on the mound and a runner already in scoring position. Why is Hernández in the lineup if the Dodgers don’t trust him to face a left-hander? Why are the Dodgers giving away a free out when they already struggled to score with their chances?

Along with his failure to properly manage the hitters, his pitching management wasn’t all that much better.

During Game 4, Tyler Glasnow issued a walk with one out. Both Alex Vesia and Evan Phillips were warm in the bullpen, and the Brewers had a few lefties coming up over the next few plate appearances.

Instead of going to Vesia, Roberts left in Glasnow, who then allowed an RBI single that pulled the Brewers within one run. Roberts then went to Phillips and decided to intentionally walk Brice Turang after the reliever started him with a 3-0 count.

Another walk followed, and then Roberts went to Vesia. With the bases now loaded, thanks in part to the late hook for Glasnow and the intentional walk to Turang, Vesia was forced to throw strikes. He didn’t, and another walk tied the game.

The night before, he was also too late with his hook for Blake Snell, who opened the seventh with a leadoff walk. At the same time, most would see that as the end of the line for their pitcher, Roberts left him in.

Snell then threw 10 pitches to Jake Bauers and could not get him out, another sign his night should be over. Roberts left Snell in for another pitch still, and that one proved to be the difference maker as Bauers launched a home run that put the Brewers ahead.

Still, that wasn’t enough for Roberts to take Snell out, and the left-hander ended up allowing another home run to the next batter before his night came to an end.

It was arguably the worst series Roberts has managed in his tenure with the Dodgers. And for a manager who was nearly perfect in 2024 and 2025, it was rough to watch him be so outmatched in 2026.

Every player didn’t perform

But to take away some of the blame from Roberts, it’s hard to manage when no one on the roster is performing, and that was the case. The starting rotation, lineup, and bullpen all failed to do their jobs in this series.

The starting pitchers the Dodgers were going to rely on in the postseason posted a 6.50 ERA in the NLCS, and their bullpen posted a 4.50 ERA. The offense went 5-for-43 with runners in scoring position throughout the postseason, and had they faced a better team in the NLDS, it likely would have led to their elimination earlier.

In total, the offense hit .185/.270/.250 with a 48 wRC+ in the NLCS and just one home run. Their slugging ability disappeared, their ability to drive in runners disappeared, their ability to get on base significantly declined, their at-bat quality was often atrocious, and this was the main reason for their downfall.

While many criticized the Dodgers for “selling out” for the home run and praised the Brewers for their “small ball,” this series was nearly the opposite of that narrative.

The Brewers outslugged the Dodgers, .445 to .250, and struck out more (30.2% compared to 23.1%). The Brewers were a team looking to do damage at the plate, while the Dodgers looked too timid, with no real approach or game plan.

Instead, it was the Dodgers who had to rely on sacrifice flies, take advantage of a rare Brewers mistake, and get lucky hits, because without any power, they couldn’t consistently create their own runs. That resulted in the Dodgers taking many poor-quality at-bats.

The offense put extra pressure on the pitching staff, which had to be perfect for the Dodgers to win.

This was a team built to lean heavily on their starting rotation. Instead, Tarik Skubal, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Blake Snell and Tyler Glasnow all failed to pitch deep into any of their games.

Skubal turned in the best start of them, and he only managed to give them five innings. Over four games, the Dodgers got 18 total innings from their four aces — a recipe for disaster from a team constructed as they are.

That forced the bullpen to cover nearly the same number of innings, with 16, and their group struggled to throw strikes as they walked 5.63 hitters per nine, and had 1.69 home runs allowed per nine innings.

A lack of strike-throwing and giving up the long ball is another recipe for disaster for a pitching staff.

The Dodgers had nearly no bright spots from their players. Instead, everyone failed to do their job.

Front office built flawed roster

The front office is not without blame either. The Dodgers’ offensive issues were apparent throughout the season, and they did little to address them, nor did they even make much of an attempt to do so.

These issues first appeared in 2025. The Dodgers still won the World Series because they could still slug, but their power numbers dropped significantly this year. Home runs can mask many offensive flaws, but this Dodgers team did not hit many compared to previous years.

Part of that was Shohei Ohtani’s health, which they managed terribly throughout the season and was another failure for them. But there were also declines from almost everyone on the roster.

The Dodgers had a clear need for more power on their club, and had an opening at second base to do it. They also could have added a better platoon partner for Max Muncy if they intended to remove him from their lineup against any left-handed pitcher, thus removing even more of their slugging ability. They could have added a better option than Teoscar Hernández and traded him during the offseason.

Instead, the Dodgers continued to bet on their players who are clearly getting older and declining rapidly. They ignored Ohtani’s health and bet on rebounds they never should have.

They did try to improve their offense by signing Kyle Tucker in the offseason, and he was the only hitter who showed up in October. But one player can’t make up for multiple other flaws.

The Dodgers should have been looking for another bat at the trade deadline. Instead, they bet on below-average players to step up, declining players to stop Father Time, and injured players to make miraculous recoveries.

The Dodgers failed to admit their mistakes in constructing their roster, and it cost them.

Dodgers limited media access

While this does not reflect their play on the field, it does show a team that was doing everything wrong. The Dodgers decided to limit media access for this postseason run, allowing only select outlets full access to players and making only select players available to all media for a limited time.

Shielding players from accountability and questions is not the way to run things. It doesn’t just hurt media outlets; it takes away access for fans and makes it more difficult for them to hear from players. The media is supposed to act as the extension for fans to hear from players, because they are the ones spending money to see them play.

In previous years, the Dodgers freely allowed all media to speak with players after games, ask questions, and relay answers to fans. This year, the Dodgers mostly shut it down, denying more than 30 outlets their usual access.

It feels like a team that got too full of itself over its success and needed to be humbled. But at best, it’s a team that wants to protect their players from criticism and answers.

Whether this series loss brings the Dodgers back down to Earth remains to be seen, but it is clear the Dodgers failed their fans in all aspects this postseason.