Celtic’s great 25 year business model – More myth than magic

So, the directors buy players cheaply, sell them on at a profit, and in doing so keep the club financially stable. In Charlie’s view, fans should be careful about criticising people who have overseen such prosperity.

On paper, that stability seems undeniable. Celtic are financially stronger than most clubs of our size. But football isn’t played on paper, or spreadsheets, and it’s here that the argument falls apart.

The supposed player trading model Mulgrew points to does not resemble the carefully planned systems seen in modern football. It is, in reality, a scattergun approach that too often leaves managers short and supporters frustrated. It resembles the betting slips at bookmakers. For every winner how many have we crumpled up and chucked in the bookies bin? We sell a Jota. Jackpot. We reinvest in the Summer of ‘23 transfer window and recklessly blow the lot.

The two most recent transfer windows exposed this beyond doubt. The sale of the club’s top striker for £10 million in January came without a replacement. Then, in the summer, we sold the back-up who had been promoted to the first choice and replaced him, after the transfer window closed, with a free transfer straight from the manager’s contact list, rather than our own shortlists.

A winger was moved on for £17 million, also without a replacement until the final moments. Jota’s long-term injury, known for months, was not addressed until the end of the window.

A left-back arrived on a free transfer, unable to play ninety minutes, and no cover the manager deemed suitable was signed until a Boca loanee was offered to the club three days before the transfer window closed, and after the club had exited the Champions League – as is too regular an occurrence, a habit even – at the qualifying stage.

All of this happened while Celtic sat on reserves of around £80 million.

That disconnect between resources and reinvestment is all the more galling because Brendan Rodgers has delivered results in his second spell despite the constraints. He has won four trophies, including two league titles, and restored some genuine credibility in Europe by guiding Celtic through the Champions League group stage, credibility we’ve eroded somewhat already in Kazakhstan.

Last season the club went unbeaten at home in the competition for the first time in over a decade. That’s quite an achievement, because prior to defeating Feyenoord in a dead rubber the season before, Celtic hadn’t won at home in the Champions League since 2013. In February this year we then came within a minute of taking Bayern Munich to extra time in the knockouts.

Rodgers has also added value to the squad – Matt O’Riley developed from a £1.5 million buy into a player valued at north of £25 million, while Nicolas Kühn saw his worth increase more than fivefold. These achievements, combined with Champions League income and transfer surpluses, mean Celtic are on track for a record turnover.

Yet instead of backing Rodgers to build on that foundation, the board have pulled the handbrake while spoon feeding Celtic Fake News with continuous digs against the manager like it was 2018 all over again.

This is where the myth of the trading model is most exposed. True player trading is about succession planning; that’s the crux of it. It’s selling players at peak value while having replacements ready to step in. It is about a productive academy pipeline and a carefully balanced age profile. And it is about trading up.

Replace players sold in the same age bracket you bought the player previously, but whose value and base skillset is now higher, as you can now afford that wee bit extra. You may have a limit you feel you cannot go beyond, but you increase your chances of success by buying young prospects further down the road to readiness. Indeed, isn’t that why you bring in the £3m a year manager? It’s not just to win Scottish baubles – it’s to develop the players for your player trading model, have them playing Champions League football, increase their value through that exposure, alongside their development gained in that environment, sell them on, reinvest and continue to grow.

Celtic tick none of these boxes in any consistent manner that would mean it could honestly be described as a successful player trading model. Key players such as Carter-Vickers, Hatate and Maeda remain at the club with no clear plan for succession. The academy has not produced a regular starter since Kieran Tierney, and in recent Scotland youth squads Celtic has only two representatives across three age groups, Under 17, Under 19 and Under 21.

The squad is weighted towards players with little resale value, while others like Stephen Welsh, Anthony Ralston and James Forrest have stayed long past the point where the club could have sold high, because we need academy products for UEFA competitions, but we’re not producing new ones.

The failures are not confined to transfer strategy. Since Rangers’ liquidation in 2012, Celtic have had an unrivalled opportunity to dominate Scottish football and cement ourselves as a stronger European presence, at the former they have been successful, at the latter they have been negligent.

Every season of guaranteed European football should have pushed the club further ahead. Instead, millions have been left behind through failures to plan adequately beyond one window to the next, and more often than not, an inability to negotiate qualification rounds, never mind compete in the Champions League proper. Meanwhile the knockout wins have been a pipe dream since 2004, shortly after Peter Lawwell took up the first of his prominent roles at the club. There are supporters, now going into their twenties who have never seen Celtic win a knockout game in their lifetime, and some hitting their thirties for whom it is a vague childhood memory.

Worse, the club’s reputation in the wider game has deteriorated further this summer. Networking and relationships are central to modern recruitment. Celtic’s approach is too often viewed as arrogant and aloof, if not ignorant. The collapse of Yang’s proposed move to Birmingham City was not only disappointing, it was embarrassing. Go Ahead Eagles, Hammarby, Plymouth Argyle, Rapid Vienna and Swansea City all either outright mocked Celtic this summer or will be loath to deal with us again.

The result is a club seen less as a smart operator and more as a difficult partner.

This leaves a dangerous question hanging over the future. If Rodgers does walk away — and his silence on extending his deal suggests that may already be in motion — who will replace him? Which ambitious, talented or demanding coach would accept a job where your best players can be sold without replacement, where £80 million sits idle in the bank, where your transfer targets are constantly undermined, your attempts to ‘manage up’ are stymied by the ‘top-down’ nature of the club’s hierarchical approach, and you are expected to be the lone voice representing it all?

Far from laying the groundwork for future success, this summer has created a poisoned chalice for whoever comes next.

The board, however, remain convinced they are succeeding, and ensure they surround themselves with those who will echo that sentiment. In their minds, they are the architects of Celtic’s success. Supporters are dismissed as ungrateful, entitled even.

Failures in Europe will be pinned on Rodgers and the players, while directors congratulate themselves on another disciplined window. That is why Mulgrew repeats their line. It underlines an unacceptable narrative that domestic domination is enough, that European football progress, the money left behind, the reputational damage, is something that should be omitted when their record is judged.

Football does not stand still. Other clubs with smaller budgets have modernised faster and left Celtic behind in scouting, youth development and infrastructure, and the B team is left to play against amateurs in the Lowland League.

Celtic are financially comfortable but football poor in European terms, and we now have domestic rivals adopting practices of European clubs who have outgrown our outdated model. Until that changes, the club will continue to miss opportunities, frustrate managers, and erode its reputation both at home and abroad.

This is not the profile of a forward-thinking club. It is the profile of a business that confuses balance sheets with ambition, and is insular in nature. The danger is not collapse but slow decline, standing still while others innovate, but the destination will be the same.

And former players need to consider if they are part of the problem when they regurgitate boardroom rhetoric to the wider support. They should know better. They should know the demands of being a Celtic player, of being a Celtic manager and the expectations placed upon the custodians of our club.

Celtic’s prosperity, our bank balance, the fans money, is sitting in the tens of millions doing nothing. Meanwhile the brakes have been applied, once again, for the umpteenth time, to ambition on the European stage. At Celtic, with our European heritage, if “that’s just the way they operate” that deserves criticism Charlie, and you know that.

Celtic in the Eighties by the late, great David Potter is officially published today Friday 5 September by Celtic Star Books. All pre-ordered copies have been signed by Celtic legend Danny McGrain who has also written the foreword for David Potter’s final book.

These copies have now been posted to everyone who has pre-ordered with copies being send all over the world. It’s been an incredible response, so thank you to each and every one of you who will be receiving your signed book shorty.

Celtic in the Eighties will be available in the Celtic superstore and all other club shops from today. And don’t forget that you can still purchase your copy directly from Celticstarbooks.com for same day postage.

Order Celtic in the Eighties today, you’ll be glad you did, it’s a fabulous read!