Explaining Risk Tolerance With One At-Bat

This post on Bleed Cubbie Blue on today's game is the kind of first-rate analysis you get on Al Gore's InterWeb:And yet, it wasn't any of those things that finally won the game for the Cubs. It was Alfonso Soriano taking off for second base, somewhat ill-advisedly, we thought, but stealing his first base since June 5, and that set up Ryan Theriot's bouncer that took a weird bounce over Victor Martinez's glove into right field.Um, why would Soriano's stolen base attempt be undertaken "ill-advisedly"? He was standing on first base with two outs in the bottom of the 10th. Let's consider the variables at play:1. The man standing at first base (the aforementioned Soriano) has successfully stolen 254 out of 325 attempts in his career (78 percent) and six out of eight times this year (75 percent).2. The man standing at the plate (Theriot) makes an out 64 percent of the time over his career and 66 percent of the time this year.3. When he does get a hit, the man at the plate (Theriot) singles 3.5 times more than he does anything else over his career and 2.4 times more than he does anything else this year.4. Runners standing on or near second base with two outs will score 21 percent of the time - while runners standing on or near first base will score 12 percent of the time. That's 75 percent more likely.Given 1, 3 and 4, doesn't it stand to reason that it makes sense to have the baserunner (Soriano) attempt to do something he does well (steal bases) in order to score on the most likely of hits (a single) by the batter (Theriot) from the base (second) where he is able to score on that hit (the aforementioned single)?So, again, what was ill-advised about Soriano's stolen base attempt?